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The knowledge of the nature and structure of trade unions is a basic requisite to correctly
model bargaining between firms and unions. Thus, in this paper the historical background
and the current characteristics of the Uruguayan trade unions are summarised.
Resumen
La correcta determinación de los modelos que describen la negociación entre sindicatos y
empresas requiere del conocimiento de la naturaleza y estructura de la organización sindical
en cuestión. Por ello, en este trabajo se sintetizan los elementos históricos vinculados al
proceso de negociación y a la situación actual de los sindicatos uruguayos.2
Brief historical overview
The existence of unions in Uruguay can be traced back to the beginning of the century, in
1905. Foundational members were mainly Italian and Spanish immigrants, many of them
linked to the anarchist movement (Zubillaga and Balbi, 1992). These characteristics
partially determined that during the first decades their role was strongly linked to the
consolidation of the political and social institutions in the country. They also explain the
future involvement of the union movement in the political life of the country.
In the early forties unions started playing an active role in wage setting. Discussions around
the level of wages in different economic sectors took place in what was called “Consejos de
Salarios” (Wage Councils). A distinctive characteristic of the Uruguayan wage councils
was the fact that they were tripartite bargaining stances: representatives of the workers, the
firms and the government negotiated at the wage councils. Their main objective was to set
the minimum wage by sector and occupation. However, they also controlled that their
resolutions were effectively undertaken and acted further as mediators in conflicts.
Whatever was there decided was to be obeyed by all firms in the sector, whether they were
seated at the bargaining table or not.
In 1964 the first central union was created under the name of CNT (National Convention of
Workers). Only two years after that, representatives of all workers in the economy were
part of the central union. The strong summoning power showed by the central union served
as a means to ratify it as an important social actor. However, with the advent of the military
government in 1973, unions and all activities related to them were declared illegal. Some
union leaders were even persecuted and incarcerated. Unionisation was completely banned.
Only at the beginning of the eighties the government, still military, authorised the existence
of associations of workers at the firm level. This smoothed the path towards re-
unionisation. In 1984, a year before democratic elections took place again, the union
movement was informally re-organised under the name of PIT-CNT
1.
                                                
1 PIT means Workers Inter-unions Plenary.3
Wage Councils were thus reinstalled in 1985, playing a very similar role as before the
military coup. However, the union movement has changed in different directions since
then. At the very beginning, and linked to the social and political environment, they played
a major role as receivers and amplifiers of different claims of the workers, both related to
the level of real wages - that have decreased around 40% in 10 years - and to the existent
working conditions. They were further a strong political actor, acting as a partner of the still
illegal political parties negotiating a way out of dictatorship with the military government.
In order to alleviate some of the most urgent claims of the society as a whole, the first
democratic government granted an immediate increase for all wages, which meant an
average rise of around 25%. By the end of 1985, nominal wages were 100% higher than in
the previous year, although in real terms the recovery was of only 15%. However, there
were other economic imbalances to account for by that time. Thus, the apparent partnership
between the new government and unions rapidly dissolved, and negotiations over wage
levels quickly acquired all the characteristics of bargaining games between parties with
different power.
Moreover, firms’ associations were more flexible than the government regarding wage
increases, so that at the firm level they often set wages over the minimum level bargained.
The most active opponent to unions’ claims in the bargaining table was, in the end, the
government. The goal pursued by the government representatives was to get wage increases
in line with their inflation target. Their power consisted in that governmental approval
meant enforceability of the output of negotiations to all firms in the sector, no matter they
were effectively represented in the council or not. Thus, it was not rare that in order to get
the approval of the government and hence guarantee enforceability, wage levels stipulated
in the agreements were smaller than the actual ones  (Forteza, 1992). In any case, firms
were free to determine the level of employment. Further, in sectors in which competition
was weak, wage increases could be easily transferred to the price of goods (Rama, 1994).
This practice was very well known and a prior matter of concern for the economic
authorities.4
Although bargaining took place at the economic sector level, the central union generally
succeeded in obtaining the consensus of the different unions to establish a common
percentage of wage increase during 1985-1992. Bargaining could be thus considered quite
synchronised along the period. However, as firms ended rising wages over the level set in
the agreement, the positive effects of co-ordination (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) finally
vanished.
In 1991 the new government publicly announced its will to abandon the bargaining table in
all sectors except for construction, health care services and some activities linked to
transportation services. It effectively did so in 1992 and by 1993 all contracts signed under
the previous regime had expired. The new institutional setting had two major consequences.
Firstly, it acted as an incentive both for firms and workers to negotiate at more
decentralised levels, particularly at the firm level. Secondly, it meant collective agreements
would no more be enforceable. As a result, membership to the central union went down
dramatically since then. This, however, does not mean unionisation per se diminished, but
that synchronisation, co-ordination and political bargaining power deteriorated. The
relationship between the government and the central union was further damaged by the fact
that the political power in the nineties systematically insisted on making the labour market
more  “flexible” and on establishing regulations ruling unions and bargaining. Unions
historically opposed to the latter while they explicitly fought against the former idea all
along the last decade.5
The nature and structure of bargaining
In the early nineties there were more than 300 trade unions in Uruguay. They represented
workers from specific economic activities but sometimes they only included those
employees belonging to a firm. These unions were further gathered in federations that
constituted, in turn, the central union. Negotiations were taken over by the federations or
groups of unions of the same economic sector. The role of the central union, apart from its
political weight, has been generally one of co-ordinating the claims of all unions and
federations. Employers, on the other hand, have organised in associations in order to
bargain with unions.
Collective agreements signed within the framework of Wage Councils have ruled firms and
workers represented by the bargaining parties since the very beginning of the union
movement. However, conditions agreed upon have been considered as lower/upper bounds
– depending on the issue – for employers and employees, instead of compulsory rules. If
the government was further in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the collective
agreements, they became enforceable to all firms in the sector until 1992, no matter they
were seated at the bargaining table or not. After that, the output of negotiations has been
valid only for the parties involved.
A distinctive characteristic of the Uruguayan trade unions is the lack of any regulation
regarding their constitution, the bargaining process itself and the possible channels through
which conflicts may be solved. As a consequence, no legal rules refer to any aspect of the
agreements, such as length of the contracts, issues over which to negotiate, or schedules for
future negotiations. However, bargaining over minimum wages by occupation has always
been done in the Wage Councils. They have generally set which practice will be followed
to raise wages as well as the amount of wage increases. In the eighties and at the beginning
of the nineties, indexation of wages to the inflation rate was done combining the past and
the expected (according to the government’s forecast) rate of inflation
2.  Co-ordination and
                                                
2 For a discussion on the type of contracts signed in the period 1985-1991 and their macroeconomic effects,
see Forteza, 1992.6
synchronisation of the negotiations helped to keep wage differentials by economic sectors
quite stable in the sub-period. Afterwards, as enforceability vanished and bargaining at the
firm level began to be a common practice, negotiated wage increases followed a wide
variety of rules, depending on the degree of competition firms and sectors were faced to
and on the evolution of their relative prices, as well as on the bargaining power of the trade
union.
The analysis of the contracts signed up to 1992 shows that other issues have also been part
of the bargaining agenda (see Cassoni, Allen and Labadie, 2000; Ermida et al., 1998 and
Rodriguez et al., 1998). Rules related to working conditions, such as length of the working
week; paid holidays; job stability; or annual extra premia, are generally found in collective
agreements. Some unions have also set hourly wages for overtime work higher than the
legally stipulated rates. Other clauses that are sometimes included relate to the position in
the firm of union leaders and the available means to solve conflicts. All these clauses,
however, do not determine directly the level of employment. Most of them may further be
translated into non-wage labour costs. Moreover, although strikes have historically acted as
a means of hindering employers from firing workers, there are no collective contracts in
which the parties explicitly reached an agreement on the number of jobs. Hence, from a
theoretical point of view, the appropriate model to analyse bargaining between unions and
firms up to 1992 would be the right-to-manage model, by which negotiations over the wage
are accounted for but the level of employment is unilaterally set by the firm, according to
its labour demand function (for a discussion on this topic see, for example, Pencavel, 1991).
In the mid-nineties a new type of conditions started to be included in the contracts: those
regulating the introduction of new technology - how to put in practice training programmes
and mechanisms to reduce the workforce - and those determining premia linked to
productivity gains. This sort of clauses reflected two facts. Firstly, the new economic
conditions faced by firms, in a framework of increased foreign competition that required
investment in technologies more capital and skill intensive. Secondly, the workers’
renewed worry about employment stability. Simultaneously, and linked to these two facts,
negotiations at the firm level are known to have included bargaining over employment7
(Rodriguez et al., 1998). Contracts signed at the firm level were many times a complement
to collective agreements ruling the whole sector. That is, they could either modify some
clauses of the general agreement or add others, especially those related to employment
stability. Thus, a new bargaining model is at work in the late nineties, one in which more
decentralised negotiations take place over both the wage and the employment levels. It is
not clear, however, if an efficient contract model is in place. Recursive models, stating that
bargaining over wages and over employment takes place at different stages, are also
consistent with the new structure of negotiations (for a theoretical derivation of recursive
models see, for example, Manning, 1987).
Membership and union power
The return to democracy in 1985 was achieved after at least two years of generalised public
demonstrations against the military regime. Unions played an important active role in them.
Within that framework, the affiliation rate once unions were legally re-organised was very
high. In 1985, the reported affiliation rate was 26% for the whole economy. The structure
by economic sector is depicted in Table 1. However, the figures cannot be taken as exact
measures of membership, due to the different unions having the number of representatives
in the national congresses linked to the reported number of affiliates. This fact acted as an
incentive to upwards bias the real figure.
Traditionally, public workers have always had a higher affiliation rate than private workers.
This remained so in the eighties and nineties. Among the private activities, those related to
the manufacturing and construction industries have shown the highest union density.
The temporal evolution of the affiliation rate shows the previously mentioned decline of the
central union. Membership, as reported in the annual congresses, has systematically gone
down, so that in the last national congress the number of affiliates to the central union was
only 165000 (around 15% of employment) compared to 250000 in 1985  (Table 1).8
Table 1: Union membership 1985-1997
MEMBERSHIP
1985 1987 1990 1993 1997
Agriculture, leverage & fishing 6265 6597 4976 3200 2000
Manufacturing 73148 63176 54548 43394 31050
Electricity, gas & water 13728 14303 15023 14450 13800
Construction 14908 11156 12600 8000 4000
Commerce 12600 10818 9500 6473 6000
Transport & communications 24874 25478 22150 13115 13400
Banking & services to firms 13605 15644 15476 13377 14000
Social & personal services 89688 85887 90287 86024 81200
Private sector 145713 132493 122507 87713 65500
Public sector 103103 100566 102053 100320 99950
Total 248816 233059 224560 188033 165450
UNION DENSITY
1985 1987 1990 1993 1997
Agriculture, leverage & fishing 18,3 14,3 13,7 6,4 3,9
Manufacturing 32,9 27,3 23,0 25,3 16,6
Electricity, gas & water 79,0 85,4 91,1 91,6 93,7
Construction 28,9 16,4 17,1 10,0 5,2
Commerce 6,5 6,1 4,7 3,1 2,6
Transport & communications 32,3 35,4 32,9 19,9 19,7
Banking & services to firms 26,0 32,4 28,9 20,3 20,1
Social & personal services 20,9 22,3 21,7 20,9 19,1
Private sector 19,4 16,7 14,2 10,0 7,2
Public sector 48,4 42,0 42,3 48,5 47,3
Total 25,8 22,6 20,4 17,3 14,7
Note: Membership is obtained from the National Congresses held in each of the reported years. Union density
is defined as the ratio of membership to total employment in each sector.
Sources: Various newspapers, according to data reported by the Central Union (PIT-CNT); Household
Surveys, National Institute of Statistics.
Although membership to the central union has diminished continuously, unionised workers
have not necessarily become an extinct species. Many unions have stopped participating of
the national confederation but go on acting as representatives of the workers in an
economic sub-sector or even at a firm
3.
While the decline in union participation is substantial in the private sector, it is not so for
public activities. Among the former, workers in primary sectors, as well as those in the
manufacturing and construction industries have registered the highest de-unionisation. A9
possible explanation for the evolution of membership in the primary and manufacturing
sector is that commercial liberalisation and increased competitiveness have set a limit to
wage increases as employment stability has been at stake. They have further forced a huge
re-structuring of many firms and even of some industries as a whole. Jobs have been lost at
an unregistered rate and hence workers have found bargaining at a decentralised level more
profitable to achieve their goals. This might also be the case for the construction industry,
although not because of a loyal competition but because of the increased degree of
informality in the industry.
Agreements signed at the firm level have always existed since 1985. However, their
number was negligible until the nineties. During the period 1985-1989, 94% of all contracts
were signed at the industry level while the percentage declined to 34% by 1997. Some of
them (2%), although signed between the trade union and the employers’ association, not
being enforceable anymore, covered only those firms and workers effectively represented at
the bargaining table.
Finally, while membership has gone down dramatically, the new structure of bargaining has
meant an even larger decline in the coverage of collective agreements (Rodriguez et al.,
1998). Their lack of enforceability, once the government retired from negotiations, has
implied that coverage in 1997 is only 23%, compared to almost 90% in 1990, as it is shown
in Table 2
4.  Further, it has implied that membership and coverage became very similar
concepts in 1997.
           Table 2: Membership and coverage
         1990 and 1997 (%)
Membership Coverage
1990 1997 1990 1997
Manufacturing 23 17 83 17
Commerce 52 . 5 9 1 6
Services 26 21 91 25
Total 20 15 88 23
    Source: Rodriguez et al., 1998
                                                                                                                                                    
3 Workers of the frozen meat industry and those belonging to the major firm producing beer are examples of
these two cases, respectively.
4 The percentages were calculated analysing contracts that were registered at the Ministry of Labour. As the
parties are not obliged by law to do so, the figures cannot be considered as definite.10
Wage and employment determination in Uruguay cannot be analysed without taking into
account the role of trade unions. However, the mechanisms at work have changed along the
last 15 years. The suitable bargaining models are thus different depending on the time
period, at least from a theoretical point of view. In the eighties, it is possible to derive the
output of bargaining assuming a right-to-manage model and a centralised negotiation, while
the level of wages can be thought of as their main concern. By the mid-nineties, on the
contrary, it is not possible to consider bargaining as a process involving all workers
simultaneously anymore, while employment has emerged as a possible additional target of
negotiations. Moreover, the utility function of the parties cannot be considered as similar
between the different trade unions anymore, but dependent on the particular performance of
the firm or economic activity. The effects of the new structure of bargaining on the overall
unemployment rate relative to the previous framework are not clear-cut. Bargaining at the
industry level was demonstrated to be the least favourable world if the main concern was
employment, relative to both centralised and completely decentralised negotiations
5.
However, if synchronisation and co-ordination were present, as in the Uruguayan case
during the pre-1993 period, the effects on employment should be similar to those of the
centralised bargaining. On the other hand, the probable change in the bargaining model
itself and in the objective function of the players involved may also have influence over the
general unemployment rate. The decline of coverage and the generalisation of firm level
bargaining strongly suggest the use of recursive models - of which the efficient contracts
model is a particular case - to analyse the Uruguayan case from 1993 onwards.
                                                
5 Calmfors and Driffill (1988) demonstrated so while Rama (1994) found exceptions to the result.11
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